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levy was of course unavailing, and the law was designed to protect
his possession. If, however, there was an encumbrance on the
property merely, the third section of the act directs how that is to
be considered.
In this case it appears that Vogler had prior to the levy conveyed
his title to the premises to one Suess, and upon this ground it is
claimed that he forfeited all the protection which the homestead
law gives. If this conveyance was in good faith, and valid, then
it is obvious thatt an execution and a sale under it would convey
nothing; but if it was fraudulent, as it doubtless was deemed to be
by the execution-creditor, then the title was in Vogler, and the
homestead law exempted it from execution. It appears to be the
received opinion that neither a fraudulent conveyance nor an act
of bankruptcy on the part of the head of the family will produce
a forfeiture of the benefits of the homestead exemption: Cox v.
Wilder, 2 Dillon C. C. 46. Judge DILLON thinks these laws are
chiefly for the benefit of the family and therefore will not allow
the fraudulent acts of the head of the family to subvert the policy
of the law, and this opinion was upon our Missouri Statute.
As Nussberger then derived no title from either execution, levy
or sale, he could convey none to Montgomery, and the proposed
sale by Montgomery would convey no title. And this is urged as
a reason why no injunction should be allowed.
But it is the true policy of courts to prevent litigation, and a
sale by the trustee would undoubtedly cast a doubt over plaintiff's
title, and embarrass a sale, if he desired to sell.
The judgment is affirmed.
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ACTs OF THE: LEGISLATURt-PRESUIPTON AS TO THFSI VALIDITY.-The justices of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in answer
to a communication from the Governor of the State, reqnesting. .their
opinion on the validity of an Act of the Legislature, which though it
was found in the office of the Secretary of State with other acts pzssed
at the same session, and was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the President of the Senate, and by the Governor himself, had never in fact passed the House, replied that it was their unanimous opinion that although the finding of an Act of the Legislature
in the proper repository, and properly and legally signed, is primdfacie
evidence that the said act had been passed in the manner required by
the Constitution to make it a valid statute : Nevertheless, the journals
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of each branch of the Legislature are to be considered and treated an
authentic records of the proceedings, and if upon their inspection, it
plainly appears that the two branches did not in fict concur in the passage of a bill, that then, the priind facie evidence wilt be overcome,
and the act will be held to be invalid, and of no effect as a law.
NATIONAL BANKS-LIEN ON STOCK.-Nat. State Bank of Arewark
v. Second National Bank of Louisville, in the Louisville Chancery
Court. The National State Bank of Newark, claiming to be entitled
to certain shares of stock in the Second National Batik of Louisville,
and in its possession, filed a bill in chancery for the purpose of compelling the transfer of the stock on the books of the Second National
Bank. The facts disclosed by the bill were as follows: One Spencer
Scott, tfie owner of the stock in question, being indebted to the plaintiffs, (prior to the 3d of October 1866), in 'March 1869, transferred the
certificate of stock to the plaintiffs, and executed a warrant of attorney
which was on the back of the certificate, and in the usual form for its
transfer. Scott was afterwards declared a bankrupt in 1869, and duly
discharged; during the proceedings in bankruptcy, the defendants claiming as creditors of Scott, demanded that the stock in their bank should
be sdt off against Scott's indebtedness, and it was finally assigned to
them by the assignee.
They now refused to transfer the stock to the plaintiffs, alleging that
they were the lawful owners, and claiming that it was rightfully assigned
to them by virtue of a clause in their articles of association, which
provided, "that the board of Directors shall have power to make a bylaw to prohibit the transfer of any stock owned by a stockholder, who
may be liable to the Bank, either as principal debtor or otherwise."
That such a by-law had been made, and Scott being indebted to the
bank in a greater sum than the value of the stock, as early as November 1866, long prior to the transfer to the 'plaintiffs, could not make a
.legal transfer, and that they were therefore entitled in equity, and
could not be compelled to make a transfer on their books. The Vice
Chancellor, HARLAN, held, That the National Bank of Louisville was
incorporated under the Act of Congress of 1864. That the prior act
of 1863, the thirty-sixth section of which provided that no shareholder
should have power to sell or assign his share so long as he was indebted
to the bank, was expressly repealed by the Act of 1864. That it was
the evident intention of Congress, by leaving out of the law of 1864,
the thirty-sixth section of the Act of 1863, to relieve the holders of
bank shares from the restrictions imposed by that section, and by
making the shares of stock easily convertible to enhance their value,
this was done advisedly, and the Supreme Court of the United States
in Bank v. Lanier, 11 Wallace 376, in commenting on the omis.ionm,
say, The policy on the subject was changed; it was manifestly found to
be detrimental to the banking interests, the transferring of stock being
one of the most valuable franchises conferred by Congress. That such
being the case, the defendants could not indirectly accomplish by means
of a by-law, that which it was the avowed intention of Congress to prevent, and such by-law would fail of that effect, though the 12th section
of the Act does give the bank power to prescribe the manner in which
its stock shall be transferred.
The Vice Chancellor further held that there was evidence in this
case tending to show that the defendant had discounted the notes of
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Scott, on which he had become liable, relying on the security of this
very stock. That this was in direct violation of the thirty-fifth section
of the Act of 1864, prohibiting "any loan or discount by a bank on
the security of the shares of its capital stock," also the purchasing or
holding such shares unless necessary to prevent loss on a debtpreviousl.y
contracted in good faith; and the transaction being illegal, gave the defendant no claim to any property in the stock. The Bank 'having no
valid lien then, under the Act of Congress or its articles of association,
the plaintiff was entitled to a transfer.
LIFE INSURANCE-CONTRACTS OF INSURANCE WITH PUBLIC ENEMIES ARE UNLAWFUL-EXECUTED CONTRACTS ARE ONLY SUSPENDED
r
BY WAR-EXECUTORY ONES ARE ABROGATED.. E. Taitt et al.,

Heirs of Doctor Samuel Bond, deceased, v, New York Life Itzsurance
Compngy -In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western
District of Tennessee. This was an action on a policy of insurance, issued
by the defendant in 1854, to Dr. Samuel Bond, who then was and continued until his death in 1862, a resident of the state of Tengessee.
The policy was issued in the usual manner from the home office of
the company in New York, the application being made and the policy
transmitted through their local agent at Memphis.
By the terms of the policy, the insured was to pay an annual premium on the 17th day of October in each year, during the continuance
of the policy, and upon his compliance therewith, were at his death to
pay to his representatives the amount of the policy. Amongst other
things, the policy also provided that in case the insured "shall not pay
the said premiums on or before the several "days bereinbefore mentioned
fbr the payment thereof, then, and in every such ease, the said company shall not be liable for the payment of the sum insured or any part
thereof, and this policy shall cease and determine.'
The annual premiums were duly paid at maturity by the deceased, to the local agent
of the defendant at Memphis, up to and including the year 1864, the
last payment being made in October of that year. The agent of the
company continued to act as such until sometime in July or August, of
the year 1861, when all intercourse between the people of the state of
'Tennessee and those of the loyal states, was cut off by the breaking out
-of actual hostilities; whereupon he ceased to act further as agent, and
,has never since acted in that capacity. On or before the 17th of Oc,tober 1861, a tender of the premium due in that year was made. on
behalf of the insured to the agent, which tender was refused, the agent
,having no receipts for the said premium, signed by the home officers of
,the company in his possession. The officers of the company had no
'knowledge of the tender until after the death of Dr. Bond, nor did
,they ever communicate with their agent in reference to the same. This
-suit was brought in October 1869, to recover the amount of the insur-"
-ance less the unpaid premiums.
The court, EMMONS, J., rendered judgment for the defendant, holdding, in opposition to the cases of Hamilton v. Insurance Co., 9 Blehford
:334, and Sa,nds v. Same. 59 Barbour 556: 1. That a policy of insurgance, which indemnifies a public enemy against loss in time of war, is
unlawful; and where entered into before hostilities, is abrogated when
they occur. 2. That where a life policy provides that it shall be void
upon the non-payment of premiums within the time prescribed, such
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payment is a condition precedent; time is of the essence of the contract,
and there can be no recovery if" punctual payment is omitted. 3. That
where the performance of a condition precedent becomes unlawful, or
by the act of God, impossible, this will not authorize a recovery on the
contract without perfbrmance. Such a case is distinguished from those
in which subsequent impossibility and illegality are relied upon as, a
defence. 4. That a contract of insurance, the continuance of which
depends upon the election and acts of tile insured, is not like a debt,
the obligation of which is absolute, and which is only suspended by
war. 5. That the reasons for the dissolution of executory contracts by
war, are not alone that such contracts involve inter-communion across
the hostile lines, or that they relate to property liable to capture; but
more especially because their execution increases the resources of the
enemy. 6. That a court of equity has no authority to decree the specific performance of an agreement in favor of a party who has failed to
perform a condition which is of the essence of the contract, although
prevented by its becoming subsequently illegal or impossible by an act
of God. 7. That the agency of one representing an insurance company, authorized to receive premiums and renew policies, becomes unlawful when the insured and insurer become public enemies. See Hancock v. . Y. L fe Ins. Co., ante, p. 103.

PUBLIC PARKS-CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF LEGISLATIVE OVER
MUNICIPALITIES.-In the case of Tlhe People ex s'el, The Board of
ParZ Commissioners of Detroit v. The Common Council of Detroit,
the Supreme Court of' Michigan defines with considerable precision
the limits of legislative power over municipal corporations. The question arose under the following circumstances. In 1871, the Legislature
of Michigan created a Board of Park Commissioners, with power to
adopt plans for a public park for the use of the city of Detroit, to select
the needful lands and make conditional contracts for the purchase of
the same, subject to ratification by the Common Council and the vote
of a meeting of the citizens, and upon such ratification and approval,
Councils were authorized to issue bonds on the credit of the city to pay
for the land. The commissioners were duly appointed, and after organization proceeded in discharge of their duties to select what they considered the most. eligible site, and reported the same to Councils, who
submitted the proposition for the issue of bonds to pay for the lands, to
a citizens' meeting. Two meetings were held, but there was so much
confusion and violence on both occasions, that no result was obtained.
The Legislature then, by an Act passed in March 1873, greatly enlarged the powers of the Commissioners, permitted them to purchase lands, only limiting the amount to be paid, and declared that Councils
should provide the money necessary to complete the purchase.
Acting under this legislation the Board reported to Councils that a
proper site had been selected, and land not exceeding in cost $300,000
had been contracted for, which sum they requested Councils to pay by
issuing-the necessary amount of bonds. Councils having failed to make
the appropriation, the Board applied to the Supreme Court for a mandamus.
In refusing the writ, the Court laid down two propositions as applicable to the case: I. That in all matters of general concern the Legislature have complete control over municipal corporations, there is no local

